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Abstract
Permissions are highly sensitive in Internet-of-Things (IoT) applications, as IoT
devices collect our personal data and control the safety of our environment. Rather
than simply granting permissions, further constraints shall be imposed on permission
usage so as to realize the Principle of Least Privilege. Since IoT devices are physically
embedded, they are often accessed in a particular sequence based on their relative
physical positions. Monitoring if such sequencing constraints are honoured when IoT
devices are accessed provides a means to fence off malicious accesses. This paper
proposes a history-based capability system, HCAP, for enforcing permission sequencing
constraints in a distributed authorization environment. We formally establish the
security guarantees of HCAP, and empirically evaluate its performance.
1 Introduction
Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices collect our personal data (e.g., wearables, sensors) and
control the safety of our environment (e.g., thermostat, smart locks). Granting permissions to
access IoT devices often comes with significant privacy, security and even safety implications.
Yet, authority delegation is a common use case in IoT applications. For example, envision the
wide deployment of smart locks on an organization campus. Permissions to unlock various
entrances must now be properly granted to members of that organization. In this work, we
are concerned with the potential misuse of permissions by users of IoT devices.
Rather than simply granting permissions, further usage constraints shall be imposed on
permissions in order to rule out potentially malicious usage patterns. Simple examples of
this would include contextual constraints such as not allowing entry after midnight. Such
constraints are a way of realizing the Principle of Least Privilege [33]. But we can do even
better than contextual constraints. Since IoT devices are physically embedded, they are often
accessed in a particular sequence based on their relative physical positions. Monitoring if
such sequencing constraints are honoured provides a means to fence off malicious accesses
to devices.
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Example 1 (Physical Embeddedness). Alice often stays after office hour, when all the doors
of her organization are locked. Special permissions are granted to her to unlock certain doors.
When Alice leaves for the day, she passes through entrances A, B and C (corresponding
respectively to the lab door, the computer science building entrance, and the campus gate) in
that physical order. Not only does Alice require the permissions to unlock the smart locks at
A, B and C, ordering constraints shall also be imposed so that, during off hours, C (campus
gate) is not unlocked before the authorization system registering her unlocking A (lab door)
and B (building entrance). Directly unlocking C (campus gate) without going through A (lab
door) and B (building entrance) could very well mean her smartphone has been picked up by
an unauthorized party trying to enter the campus from the outside.
Permission sequencing constraints are also important when device accesses must conform
to a workflow specification. Kortuem et al. use the term process awareness to refer to
the ability of smart objects to guide their users in following operational procedures [21].
Procedure guiding is envisioned to be a key feature of, say, smart construction objects [29].
Example 2 (Process Awareness). Suppose an industrial process follows an explicitly artic-
ulated workflow, in which two conceptual steps, S1 and S2, are sequentially ordered. Permis-
sions to operate equipments are assigned to each step [40, 9]: e.g., permissions p1 and p2 can
be exercised in step S1, and permissions p2 and p3 can be exercised in step S2. The permis-
sion assignment and the ordering of workflow steps jointly induce sequencing constraints on
permission usage: Once p3 is exercised, it is obvious that S2 is being executed, and thus p1
shall no longer be allowed (i.e., no p1 after p3). Violation of this sequencing constraint is a
sign of equipment misuse.
Constraining the order in which permissions are exercised is in fact the spirit of History-
Based Access Control (HBAC) [12, 35, 38, 39, 13, 22, 25], in which the authorization decision
of an access request is a function of the access history. HBAC policies can be imposed to
restrict permission usage once an access pattern has been detected (no p1 after p3). This
feature can be leveraged for enforcing the following forms of permission usage control.
Example 3 (Permission Usage Control). Suppose a campus visitor is only allowed to access
a facility (e.g., a smart coffee dispenser) no more than four times during her visit. In other
words, we want the authorization system to deny the usage of a permission after it has been
exercised for a number of times. In short, permissions are seen as consumable resources. A
second form of permission usage constraints is the cardinality constraint, which demands
that no more than k of the permissions in a set P can be exercised [34]. In the special case of
|P | = 2 and k = 1, the constraint enforces permission-level mutual exclusion. Similarly,
the Chinese Wall policy [8] can be seen as a third form of permission usage constraints: Once
a resource has been accessed, access to resources in conflict with the former will be denied.
Enforcing HBAC policies requires support from the authorization system. The growing
scale of smart devices and casual users makes it necessary for device administrators to
be able to manage access control policies centrally, while enabling devices to enforce such
policies in a decentralized manner (i.e., without the mediation of a centralized reference
monitor). Typically, an unforgeable capability (aka security token) is issued by a centralized
authorization server to a client, who in turn presents the capability to the resource custodian
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as a proof of authorization. Examples of such distributed capability systems include the
Identity-based Capability System (ICAP) [16], CapaFS [32], O’Auth [18], OpenID [31], and
Macaroons [5]. The dual requirements of centralized policy administration and decentralized
policy enforcement are the main driver behind the recent push by access management solution
providers [15, 30] to adopt the User-Managed Access standard [27] as the choice platform for
access management in IoT applications. More generally, distributed capability systems have
emerged as a popular choice for decentralized access control in the IoT literature [26, 17, 19].
Unfortunately, none of the distributed capability systems surveyed above offers adequate
support for HBAC. The crux of the problem is that policy enforcement in HBAC is a stateful
process. A traditional capability, however, captures a static set of authorized permissions.
Such capabilities will have to be revoked and reissued by the centralized authorization server
whenever the state of HBAC enforcement changes, causing the authorization server to be
contacted frequently, thereby nullifying the benefit of decentralized access control promised
by distributed capability systems.
This paper proposes a History-Based Capability System, HCAP, for regulating the order
in which permissions are exercised in a distributed authorization environment. HCAP is
an extension of ICAP [16]. HCAP capabilities carry sequencing constraints in the form
of security automata (SA) [35]. Exercising a permission produces an SA state transition,
invalidates the existing capability, and generates a new capability reflecting the new SA
state. Since the proposed scheme minimizes communication with the central authorization
server, and does not require the IoT devices to know about the access control policies, HCAP
makes a good building block for UMA-style combination of centralized policy administration
and decentralized policy enforcement. We claim four contributions:
(1) We describe the design of HCAP, a distributed capability system that can enforce
history-based access control policies (see §3).
(2) We formally establish the security guarantees of HCAP in the form of a safety property
and a liveness property (see §4).
(3) In the formulation of core HCAP, it is assumed that the permissions associated with an
SA are all related to a single device. We propose an extension to HCAP that relaxes
this restriction, thereby allowing an SA to regulate the permission usage of multiple
devices (see §5).
(4) We empirically evaluate the performance of HCAP (see §6).
2 Related Work
There are two kinds of distributed authorization systems [37]. The first kind are the
credentials-based authorization systems (F. Schneider’s terminology), in which the
client presents a set of certificates to an authorization system as a proof of policy compli-
ance [1, 2, 24, 3]. The certificates in the compliance proof are typically issued by different
authorities, and each certificate corresponds to an assertion in a logical language used for
specifying conditions of authorization. The authorization system is presumed to know the
access control policy, which is specified in the aforementioned logical language. The second
kind are the distributed capability systems , in which the authorization system, upon
successful check of policy compliance, issues to the client an unforgeable capability (aka
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security token) [16, 32, 18, 31, 5]. The client then presents the capability to resource cus-
todians to gain access without further mediation of the authorization system. The resource
custodians are thus freed from needing to know and manage the access control policies.
This work contributes to the literature of the second kind. To the best of our knowledge,
HCAP is the first distributed capability system to support History-Based Access Control
(HBAC). We advocate the employment of this feature for sequencing permission usage in
IoT environments.
HCAP is an extension of ICAP [16] in order to enforce HBAC policies. While an ICAP
capability carries the list of granted permissions, an HCAP capability carries a partial spec-
ification of an SA, which we call an SA fragment. In the degenerate case when the SA has
only one state, an HCAP capability is structurally equivalent to an ICAP capability. An-
other point of comparison concerns the exceptions. Exceptions are created in ICAP when
the authorization server informs the resource server of capability revocations. In HCAP, an
exception is created when the resource server exercises a permission that leads to SA state
transition, thereby invalidating an existing capability. In addition, HCAP exceptions are
much more complex: each exception chronicles the history of SA state transition, rather
than a single event of revocation.
ICAP has also been extended by Mahalle et al. for IoT applications [26]. Their extension
does not support HBAC.
The State-Modifying Policy (SMP) language is an authorization logic that supports the
specification of changes to the protection state as a result of authorization [4]. SMP is
designed particularly for HBAC policies. Its enforcement model, however, assumes a cen-
tralized resource guard (aka PEP), and is therefore incapable of supporting decentralized
access control in the manner of HCAP.
In history-based access control, the history of access is tracked by a reference monitor, and
this access history forms the basis of making authorization decisions [12, 35, 38, 39, 13, 22, 25].
Schneider proved that only safety properties are enforceable using a reference monitor that
tracks execution history, and proposed the Security Automata as an automata-theoretic
representation of reference monitors [35]. In this work, permission sequencing constraints
are encoded as a Security Automaton and embedded in a capability. State transition occurs
when the capability is presented to a resource custodian, who may not immediately relay this
change back to the central authorization server. The representation of the current automaton
state is therefore distributed across multiple participants. The technical challenge addressed
by HCAP are (a) to ensure the coherence of this distributed representation, (b) to provably
prevent replay attacks, and (c) to achieve the above while minimizing communications with
the authorization server.
3 A History-Based Capability System
3.1 Overview
Protocol Participants. We envision a distributed authorization system akin to UMA
[27], consisting of resource servers, clients and an authorization server.
Resource servers. Each resource server encapsulates a number of resources within a
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single device, and acts as their custodian. For example, a smart weather station tracks
a number of weather readings, each considered a separate resource. Operations can be
performed on the resources. In the smart weather station, an operation for a given weather
reading (e.g., temperature) can be “retrieve” or “post reading to Facebook.” A permission
is an operation-resource pair. An access request is a request for the resource server to
exercise a permission: i.e., perform the operation on the resource.
Clients. Clients are users who, mediated by software systems (e.g., smartphone apps),
direct access requests to resource servers.
Authorization server. The authorization server is responsible for access management.
Administrators of resource servers and their resources may specify access control policies
to indicate which permission is granted to which client. We assume that an Application
Programming Interface (API) is in place for an administrator to specify resources and oper-
ations to be protected. What is unique in HCAP is that the access control policy not only
grants a set of permissions to a client, but also prescribes constraints on the order in which
the permissions are to be exercised. As we shall see below, such constraints will take the
form of a security automaton [35].
The authorization server issues capabilities [10] to clients, who in turn present the capa-
bilities to resource servers.
Trust Assumptions. The following are assumed. (1) The authorization server and re-
source servers are trusted parties. (2) Clients are not trusted: they actively attempt to forge,
share with others, or replay capabilities (and other tickets). They are also unreliable: they
may lose capabilities (and other tickets) that have been issued to them. (3) A public key
infrastructure (PKI) is in place, so that the authorization server and the resource servers
can authenticate one another, as well as the identity claims of clients. It is assumed that the
authorization server can verify membership of the resource servers and clients that belong
to the organization. (4) Each resource server has established a shared secret with the autho-
rization server. (5) Devices are equipped with a secure untamperable hardware that holds
their secret values. (6) We assume a central clock that is used to synchronize all individual
clocks in the system, and assume entities communicate over secure channel.
Design Objectives. HCAP is designed with the following objectives in mind.
O1 Resource servers shall not maintain knowledge of client identities and sequencing
constraints. The authorization server alone is responsible for access management. In other
words, when access control policies evolve, the resource servers do not need to be reconfigured.
O2 Communication with the authorization server shall be minimized, because that server
is a communication bottleneck. A protocol in which every access request is mediated by the
authorization server is considered a non-solution.
O3 The computational demand for resource servers shall be minimized, as these servers
are computationally constrained.
Solution Approach. The sequencing constraints for permissions are essentially safety
properties [23], encoded as security automata (an automata-theoretic representation of ref-
erence monitors) [35]. When a client initiates a protocol session, a security automaton is
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started to monitor the order in which permissions are exercised in that session. The autho-
rization server tracks the current state of that automaton. Since the resource server does
not know the security automaton (O1), and the authorization server shall not be involved
in policy mediation (O2), part of or all of the security automaton is carried in the capa-
bility. When the client presents the capability to a resource server for gaining access, the
resource server simulates the automaton’s state transition. State transition is not commu-
nicated immediately to the authorization server (O2). Instead, the resource server records
the state transition, and issues a new capability to the client (while revoking the previous
one). To conserve the computational resources of the resource server, the HCAP protocol
has the resource server flushes its record of state transitions back to the authorization server
from time to time, a process known as garbage collection (O3). For the same reason, the
capability may not carry the full specification of the security automaton, thereby making
capability processing lightweight (O3).
As the knowledge of the authorization server in the automaton state may lag behind
the state transitions carried out remotely by resource servers, the current state of the se-
curity automaton is a datum distributed between the authorization server and the resource
servers. The design of HCAP ensures the coherence of this distributed representation of the
automaton state, and that outdated capabilities are not replayed by the client to gain access
illegally.
Core HCAP To facilitate presentation, this and the next section will present core HCAP ,
in which there is only one resource server. The extension of core HCAP to handle multiple
resource servers is deferred to §5.
Preliminaries. We write dom(f) and ran(f) respectively for the domain and range of
function f . A partial function f : A 6→ B is a function f with domain A′ ⊆ A and
codomain B. A finite partial function (i.e., finite domain) is also called a map.
3.2 Building Blocks
Security Automata. A security automaton is an automata-theoretic encoding of a
safety property [35]. Here, we adopt the finitary variant of deterministic security automaton
as defined by Fong [13]. A Deterministic Finite Security Automaton (DFSA), or
simply Security Automaton (SA) in this work, is a tuple (Σ, Q, q0, δ), where Σ is a finite
set of permissions, Q is a finite set of automaton states, q0 ∈ Q is an initial state, and
δ : Q×Σ 6→ Q is a partial transition function (i.e., δ(q, p) may be undefined for some pair of
state q ∈ Q and permission p ∈ Σ). An SA is essentially like a deterministic finite automaton
in which every state is a final state. An SA accepts a sequence of permissions so long as
the transition function defines a transition for every step. Policy violation is detected when
there is no transition for a permission in the current state. For instance, the two SA below
enforce the policies described in Example 1 (left) and Example 2 (right).
// q0
A // q1
B // q2
C // q3 // q0
p3 //
p1,p2

q1
p2,p3

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When the SA M is in a state q, the permissions that bring M back to q are stationary
permissions, and the permissions that cause a transition to a different state are transition-
ing permissions. We define statM(q) = {p ∈ Σ | δ(q, p) = q} to be the set of stationary per-
missions in state q. Similarly, we define transM(q) = {p ∈ Σ | ∃q′ ∈ Q . q′ 6= q ∧ δ(q, p) = q′}
to be the set of transitioning permissions in state q.
Tickets. The authorization server and resource server issue tickets to the client, who in
turn uses them to justify requests. To ensure ticket authenticity and non-transferability, each
ticket carries an authentication tag obtained from the shared secret k and the client identity
uid . In this work, we follow the lightweight tagging mechanism of ICAP [16]. Suppose α is
an assertion, the ticket 〈〈α〉〉k,uid signed by secret key k for client uid is α | h(α | uid | k),
where h is a hash function and “x | y” means the concatenation of x and y. Upon receiving
a ticket 〈〈α〉〉?,? from a client uid , one can check its authenticity by checking that the hash
value in 〈〈α〉〉?,? is equal to h(α | uid | k). The use of uid to compute the hash value also
ensures that the ticket is non-transferrable.
There are two kinds of tickets, capabilities and update requests, which we introduce in
turn.
Capabilities. Capabilities are tickets issued by either the authorization server or the re-
source server to assert that certain permissions can be exercised by the client. A client may
present an access request along with the capability to gain access. A capability issued to
client uid for session sessid has the form 〈〈sessid : cap(tser , F )〉〉k,uid . Every capability asserts
that the SA is in a certain state q, and thus some corresponding permissions can be exercised
for sessid . The timestamp tser , also called the serial number of the capability, identifies
q indirectly by identifying the time when the SA entered into state q. The component F is
an SA fragment , which identifies the permissions (stationary and transitioning) allowed
in state q, as well as the transitions emanating from q. In some sense, an SA fragment is
a partial specification of the SA, with current state q (formal definition to be given below).
The specification is partial, because the authorization server is not obligated to encode the
entire SA in one capability. This may be because full encoding causes the capability to be
bloated, or because the authorization server desires to be synchronized with the resource
server more often, or because the underlying communication protocol limits the capability
size.
SA Fragments. An SA fragment is a representation of two things: (a) a (possibly incom-
plete) transition diagram, and (b) the current state of the transition diagram. States in the
transition diagram are identified by symbolic names. We assume there is a countably infinite
set N of symbolic names as well as a distinct marker ◦ (pronounced ‘unknown’) such that
◦ 6∈ N . An SA fragment F is a pair (defs , n?). The component defs is a finite partial func-
tion in which dom(defs) ⊂ N identifies the states of a transition diagram. For each name
n ∈ dom(defs), defs(n) specifies the transitions emanating from the state with name n. More
specifically, defs(n) is a pair (SP , trans), so that SP ⊆ Σ is the set of stationary permissions
of n, and trans : Σ 6→ N ∪{◦} maps each transitioning permission of n to either a next state
or the marker ◦. When trans(p) = ◦, the transition diagram permits the transition but does
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not identify the next state of the transition (thus F is a fragment rather than a complete
SA). We further require that SP ∩ dom(trans) = ∅, and ran(trans) \ {◦} ⊆ dom(defs).
Lastly, the second component n? of F identifies the current state of the transition diagram,
such that n? ∈ dom(defs). It is easy to see that one can use an SA fragment to partially
specify an SA (i.e., a subset of states plus a subset of transitions). An SA fragment can be
encoded as a JSON (JavaScript Object Notation) object in a straightforward manner [11].
Transitions can be computed efficiently when SA fragments are encoded in JSON. Given
an SA fragment F = (defs , n?) for which defs(n?) = (SP , trans), ∆(F, p) is defined to be (a)
F if p ∈ SP , (b) the fragment (defs , trans(p)) if trans(p) ∈ N , and (c) ◦ if trans(p) = ◦.
Otherwise ∆(F, p) is undefined.
Our security guarantees depend on the condition that the SA fragments embedded in
capabilities are “conservative” partial specification of the corresponding SA: i.e., the SA
fragment does not allow transitions that are not supported by the corresponding SA, a
notion that we formalize in the following. Let F = (defs , n?) be an SA fragment, M =
(Σ, Q, q0, δ) be an SA, and q ∈ Q be an SA state. Then F is safe for M in state q if
and only if there exists a function pi : dom(defs) → Q such that (a) pi(n?) = q, and (b)
for every n ∈ dom(defs), where defs(n) = (SP , trans), the three conditions below hold: (i)
SP ⊆ statM(pi(n)); (ii) dom(trans) ⊆ transM(pi(n)); (iii) for every p ∈ dom(trans), either
trans(p) = ◦ or pi(trans(p)) = δ(pi(n), p).
Lemma 1. Suppose M = (Σ, Q, q0, δ) is an SA, q ∈ Q, and SA fragment F = (defs , n?) is
safe for M in q. Let defs(n?) = (SP , trans). Then the following properties hold: 1. ∆(F, p) is
defined only if δ(q, p) is defined. 2. If p ∈ SP, then p is stationary for q. If p ∈ dom(trans),
then p is transitioning for q. 3. If ∆(F, p) is an SA fragment (rather than ◦), then ∆(F, p)
is safe for M in δ(q, p).
Update Requests. A second kind of tickets is an update request , which has the form
〈〈sessid : upd(e)〉〉k,uid . An update request is issued by the resource server, asserting that since
last synchronized with the authorization server, e is the list of transitioning permissions that
have been exercised by the resource server for the session sessid . The construct e is called
an exception , for it describes how the knowledge of the authorization server has been out
of sync.
Exceptions. An exception e records the history of the resource server having exercised
certain permissions in the past. It is defined inductively as follows:
e ::= nil(t) | ex(p, t, e)
where p ∈ Σ and t ∈ N. Essentially, e is a list of permission-timestamp pairs. Each pair
contains a permission p and the time t at which p was exercised. The permissions are listed
in descending order of time (more recent ones are listed first). We write times(e) for the set
of all timestamps appearing in e, as well as first(e) and last(e) respectively for the minimum
(least recent) and maximum (most recent) timestamps in times(e).
We write δ∗(q, e) to signify the SA state obtained by starting at state q and exercising
the permissions of e in chronological order. That is, δ∗(q, nil(t)) = q, and δ∗(q, ex(p, t, e)) =
δ(δ∗(q, e), p). δ∗ is undefined if one of the recursive calls is undefined.
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A similar notation, ∆∗(F, e), can also be defined for SA fragments: ∆∗(F, nil(t)) = F ,
and ∆∗(F, ex(p, t, e)) = ∆(∆∗(F, e), p). As expected, ∆∗(F, e) is not defined if the nested
calls are not defined, or if they return ◦.
Sometimes we want to apply only some of the transitions in an exception list to an SA
fragment. Suppose e = ex(pm, tm, ex(pm−1, tm−1, . . . ex(p1, t1, nil(t0)) . . .)) for some m ≥ 0.
We then write ∆∗≤ti(F, e) to denote ∆(. . .∆(∆(F, p1), p2) . . . , pi), and ∆
∗
>ti
(F, e) to denote
∆(. . .∆(∆(F, pi+1), pi+2) . . . , pm). It is not hard to see that ∆
∗(F, e) = ∆∗>ti(∆
∗
≤ti(F, e), e).
3.3 Protocol Description
Server Internal States. The authorization server and the resource server maintain a
shared secret k. In addition, the authorization server maintains three maps for session
administration: (a) monitor [sessid ] is the SA for session sessid , (b) state[sessid ] is the
state of monitor [sessid ] last known by the authorization server, and (c) serial [sessid ] is the
timestamp when monitor [sessid ] is registered by the authorization server to have entered
into state state[sessid ]. The timestamp serial [sessid ] will be used as the serial number of the
next capability issued by the authorization server for session sessid . Lastly, the authorization
server precomputes an SA fragment fragment [M, q] for every SA M stored in monitor [·] and
every state q of M . It is assumed that fragment [M, q] is safe for M in q.
The resource server maintains two pieces of information: (a) a timestamp trs , which
marks the minimum serial number of capabilities that the server considers valid, and (b) a
map ex [·], which records, for each known session ID sessid , the exception that chronicles the
transitioning permissions the resource server has exercised since the SA of sessid has entered
the state state[sessid ].
Session Initialization. A client uid who intends to access a resource server shall first
authenticate itself to the authorization server, and then request the initiation of a new
protocol session for that resource server. The authorization server will consult an access
control policy, and decide if access shall be granted.1 If the authorization decision is positive,
a new session ID sessid is created. The access control policy will grant a set Σ of permissions
to the session, and also prescribe an SA M = (Σ, Q, q0, δ) to regulate the order in which
permissions are to be exercised within that session. The session sessid is initialized as follows:
monitor [sessid ]←M ;
state[sessid ]← q0;
serial [sessid ]← current time();
The capability 〈〈sessid : cap(tser , F )〉〉k,uid is then issued to client uid , where k is the shared
secret between the authorization and the resource server, tser = serial [sessid ], and F =
fragment [M, q0].
Authorization. The client uid requests the resource server to exercise a permission p by
presenting a triple (uid , p, 〈〈sessid : cap(tser , F )〉〉?,?), where the capability is the justification
1The authorization decision can take into account identities, roles (RBAC) [34], attributes (ABAC) [20]
and relationships (ReBAC) [14].
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Algorithm 1: Authorization procedure of the resource server.
Input: A client access request (uid , p, cap), where uid is the client’s authenticated
identity, p is the permission to be exercised, and cap is a capability
〈〈sessid : cap(tser , F )〉〉?,? for session sessid , such that F = (defs , n?) and
defs(n?) = (SP , trans).
Output: A set of tickets, or a failure response.
Data: The resource server maintains the following persistent data: (a) a secret k it
shares with the authorization server, (b) a timestamp trs , and (c) a map ex [·]
that assigns an exception to each known session ID.
1 if cap is not signed by k for uid, or tser < trs then
2 return failure
3 if ex [sessid ] is undefined, or tser > last(ex [sessid ]) then
4 ex [sessid ]← nil(tser)
5 else if tser < last(ex [sessid ]) then
6 return failure
7 if p ∈ SP then
8 Exercise permission p;
9 return ∅
10 else if p ∈ dom(trans) then
11 Exercise permission p;
12 t← current time();
13 ex [sessid ]← ex(p, t, ex [sessid ]);
14 F ′ ← ∆(F, p);
15 if F ′ = ◦ then
16 return {〈〈sessid : upd(ex [sessid ])〉〉k,uid}
17 else
18 return {〈〈sessid : cap(t, F ′)〉〉k,uid}
19 else return failure ;
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for access. The identity of uid is first authenticated, and then the request is authorized
according to Algorithm 1. The resource server first checks the authenticity of the capability
(line 1). It also rejects capabilities with serial numbers earlier than trs . As we shall see below,
trs is the time of the last garbage collection, whereby the authorization server and the re-
source server synchronize their knowledge of the SA’s current states. Such a synchronization
invalidates all capabilities with serial numbers earlier than trs .
The serial number of the capability is then compared to last(ex [sessid ]) in lines 3–6. The
goal is to see how current the capability is in comparison to the knowledge of the resource
server. Line 3 corresponds to the case when the capability is issued by the authorization
server, and the latter’s knowledge of the SA state is more current than that of the resource
server. Consequently, ex [sessid ] is reset. Line 5 corresponds to the case when the capability
captures an SA state that is older than what the resource server knows. The capability
is therefore rejected. The fall-through case of lines 3–6 is when tser equals last(ex [sessid ]),
meaning that the capability is as current as the knowledge of the resource server, and nothing
needs to be done in this case.
Lines 7–9 handle requests that involve the exercising of stationary permissions. No new
ticket is issued.
Lines 10–18 specify the case when the request involves a transitioning permission. The
permission is exercised, and the transition is recorded in ex [sessid ] (line 13). The provided
SA fragment is then used for computing the next SA fragment (line 14). A new capability is
issued for the new SA fragment (line 18). Line 16 will be discussed below under the heading
Update Requests.
If the permission requested is neither stationary nor transitioning, then the request is
denied (line 19).
Update Requests. An update request is issued when the SA fragment embedded in the
capability does not provide enough information for the resource server to construct the next
capability (line 16). The client is expected to take the update request to the authorization
server, so that the latter can update its record of the current SA state. The authorization
server will only accept an update request 〈〈sessid : upd(e)〉〉k,uid if first(e) = serial [sessid ].
The result is that serial [sessid ] is updated to the current time, and state[sessid ] is updated
to δ∗(state[sessid ], e), where δ is the transition function of monitor [sessid ]. Lastly, the
authorization server will issue to the client a fresh capability, in which the SA fragment is
fragment [monitor [sessid ], state[sessid ]].
Garbage Collection. The resource server accumulates exception information in ex [·] due
to the creation of new sessions and exercising transitioning permissions. Tracking exception
information strains the resource server, which is hosted on constrained hardware. That is
why “garbage collection” needs to be performed from time to time. This involves the resource
server (a) sending the contents of ex [·] (e.g., encoded as a JSON object) to the authorization
server, (b) resetting ex [·] to an empty map, and (c) setting trs to the current time (i.e., time
of garbage collection). Step (c) invalidates the tickets issued prior to garbage collection,
forcing clients to obtain fresh capabilities from the authorization server.
Upon receiving ex [·], the authorization server updates the SA state on record for each
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sessid defined in ex [·]. More specifically, state[sessid ] is updated to δ∗(state[sessid ],
ex [sessid ]), and serial [sessid ] to the time of garbage collection.
Ticket Recovery. Clients are unreliable, and may accidentally misplace tickets. As tickets
contain crucial information for the proper execution of the protocol, two mechanisms of ticket
recovery are in place.
First, a client may contact the authorization server, and have the capability with serial
number serial [sessid ] reissued. The SA fragment of that capability is
fragment [monitor [sessid ], state[sessid ]]. This is the standard means for obtaining a working
capability after garbage collection.
The method above may not be sufficient for recovering the latest tickets. In partic-
ular, if transitioning requests have already been made since serial [sessid ], then the re-
source server has issued more recent tickets. So a second ticket recovery mechanism is
in place, in which the client may present to the resource server a previously issued capability
〈〈sessid : cap(tser , F )〉〉k,uid , such that tser ∈ times(ex [sessid ]), and then the resource server
will use ex [sessid ] together with F to reconstruct the latest ticket for sessid (either an up-
date request or a capability). Details of this mechanism are provided in the next section in
transition rule T-Rcv. The latest ticket for a session can always be recovered by applying
the first and second recovery mechanism in sequence.
3.4 Discussions
Authorization server. The authorization server has freedom to construct any SA frag-
ment as fragment [M, q] so long as the fragment is safe for M in q. The following are some
possibilities:
• If the SA M contains a single state, then the HCAP protocol degenerates to ICAP, as
all permissions are stationary.
• Consider the case when every capability issued by the authorization contains an SA
fragment F = (defs , n?) such that defs(n?) = (SP , trans), dom(defs) = {n?}, and
ran(trans) = {◦}. That is, all transition targets are unknown. Such a capability de-
scribes only the stationary and transitioning permissions (via SP and dom(trans) re-
spectively) of the current SA state. This results in highly lightweight capabilities, and
the processing overhead for the resource server is minimized. An update request will be
returned every time a transitioning permission is exercised, thereby forcing the client to
communicate with the authorization server whenever a transition occurs.
• Capabilities may be constructed to capture several levels of transition. For example, if
it is known that the most frequent transitions will oscillate among a small number of
states, then that region of the transition diagram can be embedded in the capability.
Update requests will be returned infrequently.
• If M is small, then the entire specification can be captured in the capability. No update
requests will ever be returned.
Resource server. There are two approaches to decide when garbage collection should be
triggered:
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(1) Garbage collection can be invoked on regular intervals (e.g., every 8 hours). This ensures
that sessions that are no longer active will not occupy resources indefinitely.
(2) Garbage collection can also be invoked when ex [·] reaches a certain size threshold, or
when one of the exception lists exceeds a certain length threshold. With this approach,
ex [·] is guaranteed to never grow beyond a predetermined capacity.
A combination of both approaches is recommended for a realistic implementation: per-
form garbage collection in regular intervals as well as when the capacity/length threshold is
reached.
4 Security Guarantees
Replay attacks are the main security concern for HCAP: Is it possible for the client to gain
illegal access by presenting a previously issued capability to a resource server after the SA
has already transitioned to a state q in which that capability is no longer representative of q.
In this section, we formulate a formal model for an HCAP protocol session, and demonstrate
that replay attacks are impossible (Safety). We also demonstrate that the protocol is resilient
to unreliable clients who misplace tickets (Liveness).
We model the HCAP protocol as a state transition system. Each protocol state captures
the state of the entire distributed authorization system, including the internal states of the
authorization server, the resource server and the client. A protocol state transition occurs
when the protocol participants interact with one another. The main goal of verification is
to establish a correspondence between the distributed authorization system and a reference
monitor that runs in a centralized system (Theorem 1).
Our state transition model abstracts away the following aspects of HCAP: (1) Ticket
forging is not modelled as we assume that it is adequately prevented by authentication tags.
(2) As protocol sessions are independent from one another, the model specifies the behaviour
of one protocol session only. (3) We omit the minor detail of ex [sessid ] becoming undefined
after garbage collection.
Protocol States. Throughout this section, we assume that M = (Σ, Q, q0, δ) is the SA for
the protocol session being modelled. We further assume that the authorization server has
pre-computed, for each state q ∈ Q, an SA fragment FM,q that is safe for M in q.
Definition 1 (Protocol States). A protocol state γ is a 4-tuple (tclo , A,R,C), where the
four components are defined as follows.
• The component tclo ∈ N is the global clock value.
• The authorization server state A is a pair (qas , tas), where qas ∈ Q is the state of M
last known by the authorization server, and tas ∈ N is the time when the above knowledge
is registered by the authorization server.
• The resource server state R is a pair (trs , ers), where trs ∈ N is the minimum serial
number for capabilities that the resource server considers valid, and exception ers records
the transitioning permissions that have been exercised by the resource server since M
enters into state qas .
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• The client state C is the set of tickets that have been issued to the client throughout
the protocol session. A ticket tic is of one of two forms: (a) an update request upd(e),
where e is of the form ex(p, t, e′), or (b) a capability cap(tser , F ).
Let Γ(M) be the set of all protocol states γ of the above form.
Initial State. The protocol is intended to begin at the initial state γ0 = (2, A0, R0, ∅)
where A0 = (q0, 1), R0 = (1, nil(0)).
State Transition. A transition identifier λ identifies a protocol event that causes a
change to the protocol state:
λ ::= issue() | request(p, tic) | flush() | update(tic) | recover(tic) | drop(Ts)
where p is a permission, tic is a ticket, and Ts is a set of tickets. Let Λ(M) be the set of all
transition identifiers induced by M .
We specify below a transition relation · ·−→ · ⊆ Γ(M) × Λ(M) × Γ(M). The rela-
tion is specified in terms of transition rules, which identify the conditions under which
(tclo , A,R,C)
λ−−→ (t′clo , A′, R′, C ′), where A = (qas , tas), R = (trs , ers), A′ = (q′as , t′as), and
R′ = (t′rs , e
′
rs). By default, t
′
clo = tclo + 1, A
′ = A, R′ = R and C ′ = C, unless the rules
explicitly say otherwise.
T-Iss The authorization server issues a capability to the client.
Precondition: λ = issue()
Effect: C ′ = C ∪ { cap(tas , FM,qas ) }.
T-ReqS The client requests to exercise a stationary permission.
Precondition: λ = request(p, tic), tic ∈ C, tic = cap(tser , F ), tser ≥ trs , tser ≥
last(ers), F = (defs , n?), defs(n?) = (SP , ), p ∈ SP .
Effect: e′rs = nil(tser) if tser > last(ers).
T-ReqT The client requests to exercise a transitioning permission.
Precondition: λ = request(p, tic), tic ∈ C, tic = cap(tser , F ), tser ≥ trs , tser ≥
last(ers), F = (defs , n?), defs(n?) = ( , trans), p ∈ dom(trans).
Effect: First, e′rs = ex(p, tclo , e0), where e0 = nil(tser) if tser > last(ers), or e0 = ers if
tser = last(ers). Second, C
′ = C ∪ { tic0 }, where tic0 = upd(e′rs) if ∆(F, p) = ◦,
or tic0 = cap(tclo ,∆(F, p)) otherwise.
T-Fsh Garbage collection.
Precondition: λ = flush().
Effect: First, t′as = tclo , t
′
rs = tclo , and e
′
rs = nil(last(ers)). Second, q
′
as = δ
∗(qas , ers) if
tas = first(ers).
T-Upd The client updates the internal state of the authorization server.
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Precondition: λ = update(tic), tic ∈ C, tic = upd(e), and first(e) = tas .
Effect: t′as = tclo , q
′
as = δ
∗(qas , e).
T-Rcv The client asks the resource server to recover a lost ticket.
Precondition: λ = recover(tic), tic ∈ C, tic = cap(tser , F ), and tser ∈ times(ers).
Effect: Let F ′ = ∆∗>tser (F, ers). There are three cases. (1) If F
′ is undefined, then
C ′ = C. (2) If F ′ = ◦, then C ′ = C ∪ {upd(ers)}. (3) Otherwise, C ′ = C ∪
{ cap(last(ers), F ′) }.
T-Drp The client accidentally drops some of its tickets.
Precondition: λ = drop(Ts), Ts ⊆ C.
Effect: C ′ = C \ Ts .
Appendix A enumerates the state invariants that are satisfied by the initial state and
perserved by the state transition relation.
Security Properties. Consider protocol state γ = (tclo , A,R,C), where A = (qas , tas) and
R = (trs , ers), such that γ satisfies the state invariants in Appendix A. The effective SA
state of protocol state γ, denoted eff(γ), is qas if tas > last(ers), or δ
∗(qas , ers) otherwise.
The internal states of the authorization and resource server is a distributed representation
of the effective SA state. The main theorem below asserts that the distributed authorization
system mimics the behaviour of the centralized reference monitor that M represents.
Theorem 1 (Safety). Suppose γ satisfies the state invariants in Appendix A, and γ
λ−−→ γ′.
Then the following statements hold: 1. If λ = request(p, tic) then δ(eff(γ), p) = eff(γ′). 2. If
λ is not of the form request( , ) then eff(γ) = eff(γ′).
A proof of the theorem above can be found in Appendix B.
The next theorem asserts that the client can eventually obtain a working capability
(before garbage collection occurs), even if tickets are misplaced.
Theorem 2 (Liveness). Suppose γ satisfies the state invariants in Appendix A. Then there
exists a (possibly empty) sequence of transitions γ = γ0
λ1−−→ γ1 λ2−−→ . . . λn−−→ γn = γ′, such
that each λi is neither flush() nor drop( ), γ
′ = ( , , ( , e′rs), C
′), and C ′ contains a capability
cap(tser , ) for which tser ≥ trs and tser ≥ last(e′rs).
A proof of liveness is given in Appendix B.
5 Multiple Resource Servers
We have been assuming that, when the client requests the authorization server to grant access
to a pool of resources, the entire pool is guarded by a single resource server. This section
presents an extension to HCAP for accommodating resource pools guarded by multiple
resource servers.
15
Every resource server has a unique identifier rsid . We write krsid to denote the shared
secret established between the resource server rsid and the authorization server. In §3.1, a
permission is defined to be an operation-resource pair. We assume that the resource identifier
within a permission p also identifies the resource server RS (p) that holds the named resource,
and that it takes only O(1) time to reconstruct RS (p) from p. (This is true if the resource
is identified by a URI, as in the implementation reported in §6.)
New Concepts. Our design of the multiple resource servers extension aims to preserve
the security guarantees of §4. To this end, the design is based on three concepts.
(1) Baton holding. A global invariant is that, at most one resource server tracks the
exception list ex [sessid ] for a session sessid . That resource server is said to be “holding the
baton (i.e., ex [sessid ]) for session sessid .” This allows the security proofs in §4 to (mostly)
transfer to this new setting, with one exception. Suppose a resource server rsid does not
hold the baton for sessid . Then a malicious client may replay to rsid an outdated capability
for sessid . The resource server would not be able to differentiate between the following two
cases: Is it the case that (i) no resource server holds the baton (i.e., the baton is garbage
collected), or (ii) another resource server holds the baton (a replay attack)? Therefore, in
the extended HCAP scheme, the authorization server tracks an additional boolean flag for
each session to differentiate between (i) and (ii).
(2) Remote capability validation. A capability cap for session sessid is signed by a
specific shared secret, say krsid1 , so that only rsid1 knows how to check the hash value of cap.
Capability validation also involves consulting ex [·], and thus rsid1 needs to hold the baton
for sessid as well. When cap is presented along an access request to a resource server rsid2
different from rsid1, rsid2 will now have to request rsid1 to perform capability validation on
its behalf (aka remote capability validation).
To facilitate remote capability validation, a capability now has the form 〈〈vid , sessid :
cap(tser , F )〉〉k,uid . The new element vid explicitly identifies the resource server who knows
the secret key k. In other words, k = kvid , and thus vid can validate the capability.
To preserve the efficiency of stationary transitions, we further assume the SA satisfies
the property below:
∀q, q′ ∈ Q .∀p, p′ ∈ Σ . δ(q, p)=δ(q′, p′)→ RS (p)=RS (p′) (1)
Intuitively, transitions going into a state are triggered by permissions that can be exercised
on the same resource server. Consequently, exercising a stationary permission never causes
remote capability validation (and baton passing, see below). This ensures stationary transi-
tions are always efficient. Property (1) also makes it natural to associate a resource server
RS (q) to every state q: transitions into q can always be conducted on resource server RS (q).
(3) Baton passing. When rsid2 requests rsid1 to perform remote capability validation,
rsid1 will pass ex [sessid ] to rsid2 after validation succeeds. This step is known as baton
passing . The intention is that stationary transitions performed on rsid2 after that point
will be efficient (i.e., not involving remote capability validation).
Server States and Session Initialization. In addition to monitor [·], state[·], serial [·]
and fragment [·, ·], the authorization server maintains a boolean flag baton[sessid ] for each
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session sessid . The invariant is that baton[sessid ] is true if and only if at least one of the
resource servers has the baton for sessid (i.e., ex [sessid ] is defined on that resource server).
When a new session sessid starts, the authorization server sets baton[sessid ] to false, since
ex [sessid ] is not yet defined on any resource server.
Authorization. When a request (uid , p, 〈〈vid , sessid : cap(tser , F )〉〉k,uid) is presented to a
resource server rsid , authorization is performed via Algorithm 2, which is composed of three
sections.
(1) The first section, consisting of line 1 only, has no counterpart in Algorithm 1. That
line checks whether the resource server rsid can actually exercise the permission p. This
check is necessary because p can only be exercised by RS (p).
(2) The second section, made up of lines 2–10, has the same role as lines 1–6 in Algorithm
1. The section validates the integrity of the capability, and initializes ex [sessid ] if necessary.
If rsid is specified as the validator, then Algorithm 3 is invoked locally on rsid to perform
the validation logic. Algorithm 3 is mostly equivalent to lines 1–6 in Algorithm 1, with one
exception. When rsid does not hold the baton (i.e., ex [sessid ] is not defined), it is because
either (i) no resource server holds the baton, or (ii) another resource server holds the baton.
Case (ii) corresponds to a replay attack. This is prevented by lines 3–4 of Algorithm 3, which
contact the authorization server to confirm case (i).
If the validator vid is a resource server other than rsid , then rsid requests vid to run
Algorithm 3 remotely (line 6). (During remote capability validation, the identifier rsid in
Algorithm 3 refers to the validator vid .) If validation succeeds, then the baton is passed to
rsid (lines 8–10).
(3) The third section is composed of lines 12–24. This last section of Algorithm 2 plays the
same role as lines 7–19 in Algorithm 1. Two points are worth noting. First, the capabilities
and update requests issued by rsid are signed by the krsid instead of kvid (lines 21 & 23).
Second, when p is stationary, assumption (1) guarantees that rsid = vid , and thus no new
capabilities need to issued (line 14).
Baton Compression. Resource servers have different memory capacities, and thus when
a large baton is passed, the receiving resource server may not have enough memory to store
the baton. This concern is addressed by an implementation technique known as baton
compression , which allows us to bound the length of batons by the size of SA fragments.
The key observation is that, when a transition is performed on an SA fragment (Algorithm
2, line 19, ∆(F, p)), the underlying transition diagram (defs) remains unchanged. Thus
the transitions recorded in an exception list visit states from the same transition diagram.
Eventually, a state will be revisited when the length of the transition history exceeds the
number of states in the transition diagram. When this happens, the transition sequence
contains a loop. Even if loops are eliminated from the transition history, the authorization
server can still reconstruct the current SA state.
With the baton compression mechanism, when a transitioning permission is exercised by
a resource server for a session sessid , the resource server will check that the length of the
resulting exception list ex [sessid ] does not exceed the number of states in the SA fragment
of the capability associated with the request. If the check fails, then the transition history is
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Algorithm 2: Authorize access request (mult. res. servers)
Input: A client access request (uid , p, cap), where uid is the client’s authenticated
identity, p is the permission to be exercised, and cap is a capability
〈〈vid , sessid : cap(tser , F )〉〉?,? for session sessid and validator vid , such that
F = (defs , n?) and defs(n?) = (SP , trans).
Output: A set of tickets, or a failure response.
Data: The resource server maintains the following persistent data: (a) its identity
rsid , (b) a secret krsid it shares with the authorization server, and (c) a map
ex [·] that assigns exceptions to session IDs.
1 if RS (p) 6= rsid then return failure;
2 if vid = rsid then
3 Invoke Algorithm 3 locally on rsid to validate cap ;
4 if Algorithm 3 fails then return failure;
5 else
6 Request vid to run Algorithm 3 to validate cap ;
7 if Algorithm 3 succeeds then
8 vid sends rsid the contents of ex [sessid ];
9 vid deletes its copy of ex [sessid ];
10 rsid stores the received contents locally in ex [sessid ];
11 else return failure;
12 if p ∈ SP then
13 Exercise permission p;
14 return ∅;
15 else if p ∈ dom(trans) then
16 Exercise permission p;
17 t← current time();
18 ex [sessid ]← ex(p, t, ex [sessid ]);
19 F ′ ← ∆(F, p);
20 if F ′ = ◦ then
21 return {〈〈rsid , sessid : upd(ex [sessid ])〉〉krsid ,uid};
22 else
23 return {〈〈rsid , sessid : cap(t, F ′)〉〉krsid ,uid};
24 else return failure;
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Algorithm 3: Validate capability
Input: An authenticated client identifier uid and a capability cap of the form
〈〈vid , sessid : cap(tser , F )〉〉?,?.
Output: Success or failure.
Data: The resource server maintains the following persistent data: (a) its identity
rsid , (b) a secret krsid it shares with the authorization server, and (c) a map
ex [·] that assigns exceptions to session IDs.
1 if cap is not signed by krsid for uid then return failure ;
2 if ex [sessid ] is undefined then
3 Request the authorization server to confirm that (a) baton[sessid ] = false, and (b)
tser = serial [sessid ]; on confirmation baton[sessid ] is set to true;
4 if (a) and (b) are not confirmed then return failure;
5 ex [sessid ]← nil(tser)
6 else if tser > last(ex [sessid ]) then ex [sessid ]← nil(tser);
7 else if tser < last(ex [sessid ]) then return failure;
8 return success
examined for the presence of loops. Any discovered loops are eliminated, and thus ex [sessid ]
is “compressed” into a loop-free transition history with a length bounded by the size of the
SA fragment stored in the capability of the request. Consequently, baton passing involves
only very small payloads with sizes proportional to that of capabilities.
Hard and Soft Garbage Collection. Recall that a design objective of HCAP is to
minimize communication with the authorization server (O2). Compared to core HCAP
(§3), the extended protocol has one additional communication with the authorization server:
line 3 in Algorithm 3. To make this additional communication an infrequent event, we have
devised an optimization technique by enriching the garbage collection mechanism as follows.
When garbage collection is triggered on the resource server, two types of garbage col-
lection may be performed for each session sessid . Session sessid undergoes hard garbage
collection when ex [sessid ] is reset to undefined (i.e., deallocated). This is the same sort
of GC performed by core HCAP. Session sessid undergoes soft garbage collection when
ex [sessid ] is set to nil(t), where t is the largest timestamp in the exception list ex [sessid ]
prior to garbage collection. Soft GC clears the exception list without relinquishing the baton
(i.e., a nil entry is kept). The resource server is configured in such a way that a session
with lots of activities will only undergo soft GC, and a session that has been inactive for
an extended time will undergo a hard GC. The effect is that batons are retained for active
sessions. Therefore, the extra communication with the authorization server (line 3 of Algo-
rithm 3) is only performed when a session that has remained inactive for an extended time
becomes active again. What constitutes “extended time” is a configurable parameter, mean-
ing that the extra communication with the authorization server can be made as infrequently
as possible.
As in core HCAP, the garbage-collected (whether hard or soft) exception lists are sent
to the authorization server. Along with each exception list, we now have to also indicate,
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by way of a boolean flag, whether the baton of the corresponding session has been retained
(i.e., soft GC). The authorization server will use these boolean flags to update its baton[·]
map.
6 Implementation and Experiments
6.1 Implementation
We implemented the extended HCAP protocol in Java. The implementation is based on
CoAP [36], a lightweight, UDP-based variant of HTTP commonly used in IoT environments.
An HCAP permission in this context is a pair composed of a CoAP method (e.g., GET) and
an URI. We rely on the Californium-core library to provide CoAP functionalities. DTLS,
which provides TLS-like features for UDP, is used to enable secure communication and
mutual authentication. X.509 certificates are used by DTLS for authentication. DTLS
features are provided by the Scandium-core library.
Tickets, as well as the contents of ex [·] that are sent during GC, are encoded as either
JSON [11] or CBOR [7] objects. JSON is a human readable, lightweight data interchange
format which is a subset of the JavaScript Programming Language. CBOR is a variant of
JSON that represents data in a compact binary format. We used the jackson-dataformat-cbor
and jackson-dataformat-json libraries respectively for CBOR and JSON encoding/decoding.
Our implementation consists of three reusable components (Fig. 1). The first is a client-
side library (“HCAP Client API” in Fig. 1), which allows client code to issue HCAP requests
to the authorization server and the resource servers. The payload of an HCAP request con-
tains both a capability and the actual payload which the client might want to deliver. Thus
our request payload is a JSON map with two keys, mapping to the capability and the actual
payload. The second component is a CoAP server that acts as the authorization server
(“HCAP Authorization Code” in Fig. 1). It offers RESTful services [28] for issuing capabil-
ities, processing update requests, and performing garbage collection. The third component
allows IoT vendors to add HCAP access control functionalities to a resource server that
runs on the Californium framework. More specifically, we developed a message deliverer
for mediating accesses. Within the Californium framework, a message deliverer is a hook
method which intercepts a CoAP request before it reaches the intended resource. We devel-
oped a custom message deliverer that checks a capability for its validity before passing the
request to the resources (“HCAP Access Mediation Code” in Fig. 1).
CoAP is designed for small data transfers, but sometimes the size of data being transferred
might be too large to fit in a single packet (e.g., during garbage collection). In this case we
make use of blockwise transfers [6], another functionality provided by CoAP to segment large
chunks of data as blocks and send them over. This allows us to perform garbage collection
in an efficient manner.
6.2 Empirical Evaluation
We conducted four experiments, each involving a separate machine for the client, the autho-
rization server, and a resource server (except for Experiment 4, which involves two resource
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Figure 1: Architecture of our implementation.
servers). The client and the resource servers were running on separate 3.6 Ghz Intel Core i7
(4790) machines with 8 GB of RAM, running Fedora 24 4.8 and OpenJDK Runtime Envi-
ronment (1.8). The authorization server was running on a 2.66 Ghz Intel Xeon(R)(X5355)
machine with 24 GB of RAM, running Fedora 22 4.8 and OpenJDK Runtime Environment
(1.8). All machines were connected via wired LAN on a 1 Gbps line.
The first communication between the client and the servers takes considerable amount
of time, this is due to a DTLS session being established between the two communicating
parties. To eliminate this confounding factor, we send a dummy request (ping) to the servers
before the experiments start. We used “SHA256withECDSA” to generate signatures, and
the key size was 256 bits.
Experiment 1: Incomplete SA Fragments. If the SA fragment in a capability does not
provide enough information for the resource server to construct its next capability, an update
request is returned to the client (Algorithm 2, line 21), causing an extra communication with
the authorization server. The purpose of this experiment is to assess the performance impact
of incomplete SA fragments.
The experimental protocol session involves an SA M = ({p0, p1}, {q0, q1}, q0, δ), such
that δ(qi, p0) = qi, δ(qi, p1) = q1−i. In short, p0 is stationary, and p1 is transitioning. Every
capability issued by the authorization server carries an SA fragment F = (defs , n?) for which
defs(n?) = (SP , trans) and ran(trans) = {◦}. In other words, the resource server returns
an update request whenever the request involves p1. In each experimental configuration, we
had a client generating 100 access requests, so that P% of the requests involved p1. The
client would then bring any update request to the authorization server before the next access
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Figure 2: Performance impact of various features of extended HCAP (95% confidence inter-
val).
request was generated. We repeated this for P = 0, 10, . . . , 100. We measured the average
time it took for the client to complete an access request, including the overhead of contacting
the authorization server in case an update request was returned.
The results are depicted in Fig. 2(a). The average request handling time is between 5.5 to
12.3 milliseconds (10−3 sec), an acceptable range considering that the high-end (12.3 millisec)
corresponds to the case when every access request results in an update request (P = 100%).
Experiment 2: SA Complexity. The purpose of this experiment is to assess the per-
formance impact of embedding a complex SA in a capability. The experimental protocol
sessions involve SA of the following form: Mn = (Σn, Qn, q0, δn), where Σn = {p0, . . . , pn−1},
Qn = {q0, . . . , qn−1}, and δn(qi, pj) = qj. In short, there is a transition between every or-
dered pair of states in Mn. The SA fragments embedded in capabilities incorporate the full
specification of the SA. We varied n from 1 up to 15. For each value of n, a client issued 100
randomly generated access requests to the resource server. We measured the average time
for the client to complete one request.
The results are depicted in Fig. 2(b). As n increases, the number of transitions in Mn
grows quadratically, so does the size of the SA fragment. When the value of n increased
from 12 to 13, we see a sudden jump in the request handling time. This is because, when
n ≤ 12, the entire SA fragment can be fitted into a single UDP packet, but multiple packets
are needed when n > 13. That was when CoAP blockwise transfer kicked in. This highlights
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the advantage of keeping SA fragments moderate in size.
Experiment 3: Garbage Collection. The purpose of this experiment is to evaluate
the performance impact of garbage collection (GC). Reusing the SA M12 from Experiment
2, we deployed 100 clients to issue transitioning requests to the resource server. As each
transitioning request for session sessid was served, a new exception entry was added to
ex [sessid ]. Once all the requests were issued, GC was triggered, and the entire contents
of ex [·] were transfered to the authorization server for updating state[·]. We measured the
time for GC to complete. Let R be the total number of requests made by the clients right
before GC was triggered. The experiment was repeated for R = 10,000, 20,000, . . . , 100,000.
In addition, for each R, the experiment was repeated 100 times to obtain the average GC
overhead. These experiments were conducted in two experimental configurations: (1) w/o
BC, in which baton compression was turned off, and (2) BC, in which baton compression
was turned on. This allowed us to observe how GC interacted with baton compression
The results are depicted in Fig. 2(c), with the horizontal axis corresponding to R divided
by 1,000. Without baton compression (w/o BC), the size of ex [·] grew in proportion to
R (i.e., the number of transitioning requests issued to the resource server), and GC time
grew accordingly. If we amortize GC time over individual requests, then the per-request GC
overhead ranges between 54 and 58 microseconds (10−6 sec), that is, between 0.78% and
0.83% of the average request handling time (Experiment 2, n = 12).
When baton compression was turned on (BC), the overhead of garbage collection was
significantly reduced. This was because the length of an exception list ex [sessid ] is bounded
by 12 (i.e., the number of states in M12). Thus the total size of ex [·] is never above 12×100 =
1, 200. Amortizing the GC overhead over individual requests, the per-request GC overhead
ranges between 0.72 and 7.5 microseconds (10−6 sec), that is, between 0.01% and 0.10% of
the average request handling time.
Experiment 4: Baton Passing. The purpose of this experiment is to evaluate the per-
formance impact of baton passing. Two resource servers were involved. The SA M2 from
Experiment 2 was reused, so that the two resource servers played the role of RS (q0) and
RS (q1) respectively. Consequently, baton passing was triggered when and only when a tran-
sitioning permission was exercised. A single client was configured to issue a total of 1,000
requests to the resource servers, so that P% of the requests involved baton passing. The
experiment was repeated for P = 0, 10, . . . , 100. The average time required to complete one
authorization request was recorded for each P . In addition, the experiments were conducted
in four different experimental configurations, so that we could observe how the overhead of
baton passing was affected by garbage collection and baton compression:
1. No GC/BC. Both garbage collection and baton compression were turned off.
2. GC/400. Garbage collection was triggered after every 400 transitioning requests, but
baton compression was turned off.
3. GC/100. This configuration is similar to GC/400 except that garbage collected was
triggered after every 100 requests.
4. BC. Baton compression was turned on, but garbage collection was turned off.
The results are depicted in Fig. 2(d). In the case of No GC/BC, the baton sizes (i.e.,
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lengths of exception lists) grew indefinitely because neither garbage collection nor baton
compression was turned on. Therefore, baton passing incurred significant overhead (approx-
imately 60 milliseconds per authorization request when P = 100%). Turning on garbage
collection (GC/400 and GC/100) significantly reduced the overhead of baton passing, be-
cause a baton was reduced to empty every time it was garbage collected, and thus batons
were never given the chance to grow too long. We also notice that the more frequently
garbage collection was triggered (e.g., more frequently in GC/100 than in GC/400), the
overhead of baton passing became smaller. The most promising result, however, is that of
BC, in which baton compression was turned on (even without the help of GC): it took only
6 milliseconds to complete an authorization request even when P = 100%. This is because
the batons (i.e., exception lists) are kept to a size of 2 (M2 has only two states). In this case,
baton passing involved only the sending of a single UDP packet.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
We argued that the physical embeddedness and process awareness of IoT devices impose a
natural sequencing of accesses, which can be exploited for realizing Least Privilege. To this
end, we proposed HCAP, a distributed capability system for enforcing history-based access
control policies in a decentralized manner. We formally established the security guarantees
of HCAP and empirically demonstrated that the performance of HCAP is competitive.
The following are some directions for future work: (1) integrating HCAP into UMA or
OpenID, (2) adding fault tolerance into HCAP, (3) compilation of workflow specification
and/or UMP specification [4] into SA fragments for use in HCAP, and (4) incorporating
context awareness (e.g., time, location, sensor inputs) into HCAP.
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A State Invariants
Let γ ∈ Γ(M) be a protocol state of the form (tclo , A,R,C), where A = (q, tas), and R =
(trs , ers). We articulate below state invariants for a protocol session.
Inv-1 The global clock tclo is larger than all the timestamps (e.g., tas , trs , tser , etc) within
the protocol state. (That is, tclo is always a fresh timestamp.)
Inv-2 Let ers = ex(pm, tm, ex(pm−1, tm−1, . . . ex(p1, t1, nil(t0)))) for some m ≥ 0. (That is,
ers = nil(t0) if m = 0.) Then t0 < t1 < . . . < tm.
Inv-3 One of the following two cases holds: (a) last(ers) < tas ; (b) first(ers) = tas ,
first(ers) ≥ trs , and ∆∗(FM,qas , ers) is defined. In case (a) above, there are two fur-
ther subcases: (i) ers = nil(t) for some t < trs , and trs ≤ tas ; (ii) first(ers) ≥ trs .
Remarks: Intuitively, case (a) corresponds to situations when the authorization server
has up-to-date information about the current state of the security automaton, while
case (b) corresponds to situations when the knowledge of the authorization server is
lagging behind that of the resource server. Under case (a), subcase (i) arises when
garbage collection occurs, and subcase (ii) occurs right after an update request is
presented to the authorization server.
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Inv-4 If last(ers) < tas (i.e., case (a) of Inv-3), then for every cap(tser , F ) ∈ C, one of
the three cases below holds: (i) tser < last(ers); (ii) tser < trs ; (iii) tser = tas and
F = FM,qas .
Inv-5 If first(ers) = tas (i.e., case (b) of Inv-3), then for every cap(tser , F ) ∈ C, one
of the following two cases holds: (i) tser < first(ers); (ii) tser ∈ times(ers), and
∆∗≤tser (FM,qas , ers) is an SA fragment (i.e., not ◦) identical to F .
Inv-6 If last(ers) < tas (i.e., case (a) of Inv-3), then for every upd(e) ∈ C, tas > last(e).
Inv-7 If first(ers) = tas (i.e., case (b) of Inv-3), then for every upd(e) ∈ C, one of the
following two cases holds: (i) last(e) < first(ers); (ii) e = ers and ∆
∗(FM,qas , ers) = ◦.
The following proposition can be established.
Proposition 1 (State Invariants). The initial state γ0 satisfies conditions Inv-1 to Inv-7.
In addition, if γ satisfies conditions Inv-1 to Inv-7, and γ
λ−−→ γ′, then γ′ also satisfies
those conditions.
B Proof of Theorems
Proof of Theorem 1 (Safety). We prove statement (1) first. Here, λ = request(p, tic).
By the preconditions of T-ReqS and T-ReqT, tic ∈ C and tic = cap(tser , F ). We demon-
strate below that eff(γ′) = δ(eff(γ), p). By Inv-3, one of the following two cases holds.
Case 1: last(ers) < tas . In this case, eff(γ) = qas . According to Inv-4, the only
way for the preconditions of T-ReqS and T-ReqT to be satisfied is when tser = tas and
F = FM,qas . Note that FM,qas is by construction safe for M in qas , in other words, eff(γ). Since
the effects of T-ReqS and T-ReqT ensure that ∆(F, p) is defined, Lemma 1 ensures that
δ(eff(γ), p) is also defined. Subcase 1.1: T-ReqS is responsible for the transition. Since p is
stationary for F , Lemma 1 implies that δ(qas , p) = qas . In addition, T-ReqS causes q
′
as = qas ,
e′rs = nil(tser), and t
′
as = first(e
′
rs). Therefore, eff(γ
′) = qas = δ(qas , p) = δ(eff(γ), p).
Subcase 1.2: T-ReqT is responsible for the transition. Then T-ReqT causes q′as = qas ,
e′rs = ex(p, tclo , nil(tser)), and t
′
as = first(e
′
rs). Therefore, eff(γ
′) = δ∗(qas , e′rs) = δ(qas , p) =
δ(eff(γ), p).
Case 2: first(ers) = tas . In this case, eff(γ) = δ
∗(qas , ers). According to Inv-5, the only
way for the preconditions of T-ReqS and T-ReqT to be satisfied is when tser = last(ers)
and F = ∆∗(FM,qas , ers). Since FM,qas is by construction safe for M in qas , Lemma 1
guarantees that F is safe for M in eff(γ). The effects of T-ReqS and T-ReqT en-
sure that ∆(F, p) is defined, and thus by Lemma 1, δ(eff(γ), p) is also defined. Subcase
2.1: T-ReqS is responsible for the transition. Then e′rs = ers , q
′
as = qas , and t
′
as = tas .
Lemma 1 guarantees that δ(eff(γ), p) = eff(γ). Thus eff(γ′) = δ∗(q′as , e
′
rs) = δ
∗(qas , ers) =
δ(δ∗(qas , ers), p) = δ(eff(γ), p). Subcase 2.2: T-ReqT is responsible for the transition.
Then e′rs = ex(p, tclo , ers), q
′
as = qas , t
′
as = tas . Consequently, eff(γ
′) = δ∗(q′as , e
′
rs) =
δ(δ∗(qas , ers), p) = δ(eff(γ), p).
We now turn to prove statement (2). Here, λ is not of the form request( , ). None of
T-Iss, T-Rcv and T-Drp causes a change of the effective SA state. Thus we consider only
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T-Fsh and T-Upd. For T-Fsh, the effective SA state may change only if tas = first(ers)
and t′as > last(e
′
rs). In that case, eff(γ) = δ
∗(qas , ers) = eff(γ′). For T-Upd, eff(γ′) =
δ∗(qas , e) = δ∗(qas , ers) = eff(γ) by Inv-7.
Proof of Theorem 2 (Liveness). By Inv-3, there are two cases:
Case 1: last(ers) < tas . According to T-Iss, the transition issue() produces for the client
a capability with a serial number tas , which is greater than last(ers) (according to the case
assumption). That tas ≥ trs is guaranteed by Inv-3.
Case 2: first(ers) = tas . The transition issue() is first executed, producing for the client
a capability with a serial number tas , which is equal to first(ers) (by the case assumption).
Then the transition recover(tic) is executed. Inv-5 ensures that T-Rcv produces for the
client either a capability cap(last(ers), F
′) or an update request upd(ers). If a capability is
produced, then the serial number is last(ers). Such a serial number is not less than trs (by
Inv-3). If an update request is produced, then executing the transition update(upd(ers)) will
put us back into Case 1.
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